While there are a number of articles on foreign policy at this web site, and two Chapters in this Handbook deal with foreign policy issues from the perspective of the traditional Washington/Jefferson foreign policy, as presented in the 1920s by former Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, there is need to summarize the issues under such a wide umbrella, in a format more clearly applicable to future questions. While we draw wisdom from the past experiences of Mankind, our focus is on tomorrow.
George Washington devoted a major portion of his classic Farewell Address to a discussion of Foreign Policy. He said in part:
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith:--Here let us stop.
Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collusions of her friendships or enmities.
Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient Government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation, when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion, it is unnecessary, and would be unwise to extend them.
Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments, on a respectable defense posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.
Harmony, and a liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the Government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view, that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance, it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect, or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.
Note that there is here no thought of isolation. What is being avoided is collusion with the intrigues of others; entangling alliances that compel or limit our own action. What is being sought is fair dealing based upon mutual respect; giving respect to all who deserve that respect, while demanding respect from all with whom we deal. Washington also urged very strongly in the same address, against having particular favorites among other nations.
Washington's first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, defined our policy in a memo to his Chief, April 28, 1793, dealing with the quandary presented by the French Revolution in regard to our dealings with our original ally, and discussing under what circumstances a nation might abrogate its treaty obligations:
Of these it is true that nations are to be judges for themselves, since no one nation has a right to sit in judgment over another. But the tribunal of our consciences remains & that also of the opinion of the world. Jefferson went on to quote Vattel:
"As every treaty ought to be made by a sufficient power, a treaty pernicious to the state is null & not at all obligatory; no governor of a nation having power to engage things capable of destroying the state. ... The nation itself, bound necessarily to whatever its preservation & safety require, cannot enter into engagements contrary to its indispensable obligations."
Like General Washington, Jefferson formulated his personal aversion to foreign entanglements upon reason, based upon strength, justice and respect, never a desire for isolation. Note the clear thrust of his August 23rd, 1785, letter from Paris to John Jay, discussing the coming involvement of the newly independent Americans with commerce and transportation on the seas:
Our people are decided in the opinion that it is necessary for us to take a share in the occupation of the ocean, & their established habits induce them to require that the same be kept open to them. ... We should in every instance preserve an equality of right to them in the transportation of commodities, in the right of fishing, & in the other uses of the sea. But what will be the consequence? Frequent wars without a doubt. Their property will be violated... their persons will be insulted, imprisoned etc. for pretended debts, contracts, crimes, contraband, etc.. ... These insults must be resented... yet to prevent their eternal repetition ... our commerce on the ocean & in other countries must be paid for by frequent war. The justest dispositions possible in ourselves will not secure us against it. ...
Justice indeed on our part will save us from those wars which would have been produced by a contrary disposition. But to prevent those produced by the wrongs of other nations? By putting ourselves in a condition to punish them. Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition to punish it often prevents it. This reasoning leads to the necessity of some naval force, that being the only weapon with which we can reach an enemy. I think it to our interest to punish the first insult; because an insult unpunished is the parent of many others.
The treatment of these issues by the men who formulated our basic political institutions reflects a clear grasp of the realities of human nature, and of the interaction between peoples, coupled with a sense of what is fundamentally right. It is not hard to understand why we flourished under such vision. It combines both an appreciation of the dangers and strengths in human interaction, with an easily perceived trustworthiness. A people guided by such principles command the respect and trust of those with whom they would do business to an extent to which neither a more intrusive-minded people nor a less free spirited people, could ever hope to do.
In Chapter Four, we offered Senator Reed's summary of the League of Nations debate, which dealt with a serious challenge to this policy. (That Chapter may be read in conjunction with this.) But not all Conservatives have been so adamant in its defense. In 1951, the then head of the Conservative wing of the Republican Party--but well respected by all Conservatives--Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio published a short book, A Foreign Policy For Americans (New York: Doubleday & Co.). In it, he framed the issue:
Fundamentally, I believe the ultimate purpose of our foreign policy must be to protect the liberty of the people of the United States. The American Revolution was fought to establish a nation "conceived in liberty." That liberty has been defended in many wars since that day. That liberty has enabled our people to increase steadily their material welfare and their spiritual freedom. To achieve that liberty we have gone to war, and to protect it we would go to war again.
Only second to liberty is the maintenance of peace. ...Our traditional policy of neutrality and non-interference with other nations was based on the principle that this policy was the best way to avoid disputes with other nations and to maintain the liberty of this country without war. From the days of George Washington that has been the policy of the United States. It has never been isolationism; but it has always avoided alliances and interference in foreign quarrels as a preventive against possible war, and it has always opposed any commitment by the United States, in advance, to take any military action outside of our territory. It would leave us free to interfere or not according to whether we consider the case of sufficiently vital interest to the liberty of this country. It was the policy of the free hand.
I have always felt, however, that we should depart from this principle if we could set up an effective international organization, because in the long run the success of such an organization should be the most effective assurance of world peace and therefore of American peace.... I believe the concept can only be successful if based on a rule of law and justice between nations and willingness on the part of all nations to abide by the decisions of an impartial tribunal (pp. 11 - 13).
While the "Liberal" media of the time had tried for years to paint Taft as an isolationist, it will be manifest from the foregoing, that he certainly was not. In fact, his concession to the internationalists was, if anything, naive and mistaken. There was not then, and is not now, any reason to depart from the fundamental principles of the Washington/Jefferson Foreign Policy. In expecting possible benefit from an international organization... based on a rule of law and justice between nations, etc., Taft was in reality embracing a concept of the "tale wagging the dog," or "putting the cart before the horse." We believe that the fallacy may be demonstrated even without looking to foreign lands, and the vast differences in what is viewed as law or justice by other peoples, simply by reviewing what has happened here in America, during the Fifty-three years since Taft wrote.
In his treatment of purposes, Taft also failed to emphasize two vital concepts reflected repeatedly in the prose of the Founding Fathers. As Washington stated so well, above, we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. A sense of the legitimate pursuit of our own self-interest, including very definitely our own commercial and business interests, coupled with a determination to do what was right in all our dealings with others, is very clear both in the Washington and Jefferson statements quoted, and in a huge body of similar material. Liberty was, indeed, primary--peace greatly to be desired. But the founders of modern America were also imbued with a sense of what was right and fitting, including the pursuit of a prosperous America as an essential element of any American Foreign Policy. It is one of the most compelling reasons why we must never abandon control over our destiny to any foreign force. To do so, would be to surrender the free will, so essential to our birth as a people. The basic spirit was epitomized by Jefferson's lines concluding the long recital of the Declaration of Independence, as to our future relations with "our Brittish brethren": We must, therefore, ... hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.
To be fair to our former Ohio Senator, Taft made this acknowledgment in his Foreword:
We do not need to seek further than the Sermon on the Mount to know the first step we must take if freedom under God is to survive in our country and in the rest of the world:
"A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.
"Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire.
Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them."
Taft's mistake in trying to conceptualize an effective international organization... based on a rule of law and justice lies in the absence of any real possibility for consensus as to what those terms even mean. They now, as always, have meant different things to different peoples. Take any configuration of players, at any time in human history, and it is no different.
In the immediate era, in which Taft wrote, we had just finished with one of the great World Wars of modern times. Could it have been possible to have avoided World War II, by any conceivable international organization that human ingenuity could have devised in the 1930s, and still protected the American ethos? Would any serious American thinker be willing to trust America to a World body, where a consensus would be sought as to what was just among Joseph Stalin, Adolph Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Premier Tojo, various Latin American dictators, the Swedish Social Democrats, the French Government of the moment, etc., ad nauseum.
Would the concept be more acceptable in the year in which Taft wrote? Almost one third of the World was firmly under Communist control. In addition to the still present Stalin, we had Chairman Mao--whose collectivist fanaticism made Hitler and Mussolini look almost like benevolent libertarians--and Stalin's puppet thugs in Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, etc.. Most of Europe had Socialist Governments--more of the Fabian (deceptive) variety than the Communist, but hardly sympathetic to the ethos of traditional America. The Third World was emerging from Colonial rule, embracing both Socialism and the idea of redistributing the World's wealth. Almost all of the vast ideological menagerie embraced some variety of collectivist utilitarianism, antithetical to our principles and inimical to our future.
While Communism, since, has basically collapsed in Europe, the picture is little better today. Most of the continent is under the control of Social Democrats, determined to pursue conformity under the umbrella of European Unity. While these now give lip service to some of the realities of market driven economics and to human freedom as an abstraction, they are actively engaged in suppressing real freedom to an extent seldom seen in the European past. Among the targets are traditional ethnic pride and Western moral values. They pursue, instead, a species of the specious dogma, discussed in Chapter 16 under the Gordon Allport and Norman Cousins headings. A World Government under the influence of such men must be a certain negation of the most important values of any people with a sense of heritage, history and the natural order.
The treatment of Austria, in early 2000, will attest the sense of "Justice" among the leaders of the so-called "European Community." Perhaps the reader may recall: Austria had taken so "controversial" a step as to elect a Government that believed that Austria should be preserved as a homeland for the Austrian people ("Austria For The Austrians!"); that as such she had the right to limit immigration, and preserve traditional Austrian cultural forms. This immediately provoked cries of "Neo-Nazi" (curious indeed, since little Austria was one of the most grievous early victims of National Socialism; and what the Austrians were asserting in 2000 was the exact opposite of what the Nazis had tried to do to Austria). The Social Democrats in control of most of the rest of Europe, then organized a boycott of Austria--to shouts of joy from the American Left.
In Europe today, it is rapidly becoming a criminal offense to even talk about hereditary differences, about the importance of ancestry and blood lines (genetics and race). The forced acceptance of homosexuality and Feminist mythology is becoming the rule, not the exception. Nation after nation is being deconstructed into something that bears no relationship to the traditional concept of a society that possesses an understanding and a will peculiar to herself (see Chapter 15). The sick, neurotic vision of Montagu, Allport and Cousins (discussed in Chapter 16) is being substituted for values won by the blood, sweat, toil and tears of two score or more generations.
In this hideous spectacle of the present time, we get a very, very realistic glimpse of what we might expect, were America ever to accept World Government.
There is no period in human history, when it would be appreciably different. But to make the point still more compelling, consider the antics of our own Supreme Court in the decades immediately following Taft's book. In case after case, the activist Warren Court overturned what proponents of the American tradition had defined as law and justice during our previous history. In distorted verbal contrivances, the Court deliberately pushed America away from Taft's emphasis on our Liberty towards the alien values against which we were contending overseas. The Left in our State Department hailed the trend, and sought to employ it to establish better rapport with foreign socialists. This was hardly what Taft had in mind. Most of his book was devoted to a discussion of how we should fight a Cold War against Communism.
The cruel reality is that you cannot trust any group of men to actually be just in the name of Law or Justice. Lenin considered his cause just, so did Chairman Mao, Adolph Hitler, Pol Pot. So does Tony Blair in an England being slowly strangled. Yet England was not always a politically correct socialist ideological swamp. There is little doubt but that the potential for eventual fair treatment was greater from the Government and people we rejected in 1776, than it will ever likely be from any other. They, then at least, had a quite similar ethos; similar values and a similar history. To surrender one iota of our sovereignty in the future, to any body of other men, in a foolish indulgence of wishful thinking, must be forever rejected.
Some "Liberal" internationalist will doubtless cry "Foul," in that we treat the discussion on this issue from the standpoint of a debate among advocates of a Conservative foreign policy. But we dealt with the principal arguments from the Left in Chapter 16, as well as in Chapters 4 and 6. And anyone familiar with the Debate Handbooks from the New Deal Writers' Project of the 1930s (the exact style is not handy), should recognize that "turn-about" is well deserved. The Left's idea of fair "debate" over both Communism and World Government, then, was more on the "issue" of how to achieve them, than whether they were good or evil--or proper goals for rational men.
There will be many questions on how to apply the Washington/Jefferson approach to the present era. Addressing these, frankly and rationally, is essential to preserving the inherent values. We might start by considering the ideological goal, which Robert A. Taft advanced, as opposed to his suggested means to achieve it.
Peace with liberty is a proper goal. So is a just international order. But the best way to achieve these is hardly in creating a new layer of Government; not in creating a vehicle by which either power seekers or ideologues may seek to impose their will upon the diverse peoples of the earth. The way to achieve the nearest proximation to a peaceful world, where people are free to pursue their own legitimate interests guided by justice; where most of humanity recognizes that honesty is always the best policy; is for America--especially in her era of world leadership--to remain true to her own ethic and independence. America, under the Washington/Jefferson ethic, flourishing in fidelity to insights and values vouchsafed to us by those wise and caring men; sets an example that others will naturally seek to follow. By living up to our true creed--not that of the sophists on the Left--we become an admirable model for all who seek to elevate rather than suppress the human spirit.
It is sheer madness for those whose fathers found the way--who succeeded under a better vision--to abandon that vision for a future under either the failed values of foreign theorists or in the neurotic, Ostrich-like, "denial" of our own Leftwing.
The concept of a World Government has advanced from two primary directions, both groups trying perhaps to recapture something of a distant past in the guise of pursuing an "enlightened future." The Socialists, from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler to the Fabians, each seeking a secular world order under his or their respective variety of the ideological malady, represent one group. The American secular humanist collection--the United World Federalists, the movement for an Atlantic Union, and the like--basically fall into the Fabian sub-camp, with far more in common with the European Totalitarians on this than they will ever admit.
Socialism is fundamentally a war against nature. In its appeal to mobs, its pursuit of an egalitarian dogma, it seeks not only to shackle and expropriate human effort and achievement, but to control even the basic thought processes of a people. (These points are stressed throughout this Handbook.) And the Socialist pursuit of One World, is basically the pursuit of a world, where all the things that make the individual, or an individual people, unique will be suppressed to one degree or another. To those in this mindset, the great achievements of the United States under the wise precepts of the Founding Fathers, provide a terrifying image. They are, in fact, a total practical refutation of Socialism in particular, and egalitarian mythology in general. By putting people on their mettle and allowing them to respond, we unleashed something that no Socialist system has ever been able to match, nor ever will.
But there is another mindset that is also attracted to the idea of World Government--a universal World Order. This approaches from a religious perspective. Yet while the original vision may be slightly more benign than the secular version, no one familiar with the history of religious conflict can imagine its actual achievement, any more benevolent. It is not just that some of the ugliest conflicts in human experience have been religiously induced; nor the suppression of freedom that often follows political domination by religious enthusiasts. The history of organized religion is a chronicle of theological schisms, often with very ugly fall outs. If the world ever did once accept a single Dispensation, there is no reason to believe that that condition would long endure.
Actually, many of the older, more successful religious denominations, survive best because they allow local nuances of devotion, which reflect the idiosyncrasies of diverse flocks. One may realize the mystic appeal of a World Government, linked to a World Faith; but practical men will realize that it is no rationally obtainable goal, even if it were in any sense desirable. (Believing, as we do in a true diversity of mankind, we have serious doubts as to such desirability.) There is more power than symbolism in the story of the Tower of Babel. Ultimately, it is as fallible individuals that we must each come to grips with the Divine. One must not confuse that need or process with the secular interaction of the nations of men.
In all of these reflections, it is apparent that the Washington/Jefferson Foreign Policy offers a far clearer vision for the future--even as it provided for the past--than any of those, which have been proposed to replace it. It requires no uniformity of thought, here or in any other land; only a mutuality of respect: A mutuality of respect strongly encouraged by a recognition of what Jefferson termed our interest to punish the first insult; because an insult unpunished is the parent of many others. All men act in their own self-interest. But few display the tough, moral rectitude, that our traditional policy requires. Let us consider practical, particular applications of that policy to the real exigencies of recent decades. Let us determine, if we can, whether it is in any sense inadequate to meet any conceivable situation.
The application of a foreign policy involves the determination of two concepts: When to act, and How to act. For the purpose of this discussion, we shall include the question of "why" you should or must act, under the When umbrella.
In this analysis, we will consider the following decision demanding situations, over a forty-two year period, from the standpoint both of our actual response and, where different, what a correct American response should have been:
i. Independence and Chaos in the Former Belgian Congo (1960 - 1962).
ii. The Viet Nam War.
iii. The Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
iv. The Nigerian Civil War.
v. A Marxist Victory in Chile.
vi. The Iranian Hostage Crisis.
vii. An International Boycott of South Africa.
viii. The 1990 Iraqi Seizure of Kuwait.
ix. Chaos in Somalia.
x. A Marxist Mob in Haiti.
xi. Civil War in Serbia.
xii. Terrorist Attacks on the United States.
The events in the former Belgian Congo, in the early 1960s, exposed one of the most egregious flaws in what American media and politicians of that period used to refer to as the "Bipartisan Foreign Policy." Under pressure from our State Department and European Leftists, but with very little advanced preparation in self-Government, Belgium gave the vast domain, which it had administered since the 1880s, independence as a single, unified, sovereign entity, on July 1, 1960.
Containing numerous tribes, never connected before or after the Belgian map drawers had pulled them into the same colonial claim, for convenience of administration in the previous Century; that unity was as unfair as it was fictitious. If the Colonial power chose to depart, there was no conceivable reason for those tribes to remain forever stuck with that arbitrary Colonial map; no reason but one: The international Left wanted to consolidate as many people as possible; to keep them bound together in the largest possible units, as a stepping stone to World Government. The only real difference between the Western Socialist version of this "vision" and the Communist, was over who would administer such government. America had pushed for the Congo's independence; and while still Capitalist, America had a State Department, dominated in many of its echelons by career personnel imbued with a Socialist vision.
What rapidly developed was an example of where the Fabian mindset, discussed in Chapter 16 and exemplified by the intellectual contrivances of Montagu, Allport and Cousins, actually leads. The newly independent "State," at first under the control of the Marxist Patrice Lumumba, degenerated into immediate chaos. [That he was a hard-core Marxist, there is no doubt. They named a University after him immediately afterward in Moscow.] In the West and Central regions of the country, mobs took to the streets to loot and burn in the major population centers, and embarked on the gang rape of any Caucasian woman they could find--including Roman Catholic nuns, there to teach schools and staff hospitals. Only in the far Eastern province of Katanga was order maintained; were private property and the sanctity of one's person, still respected.
At this point, Moise Tshombe, a highly intelligent, pro-Western Negro leader, friendly but in no sense controlled by a fair-sized White Settler minority--firmly anti-Communist, with a socially impeccable position within the locally dominant Lunda tribe--announced that Katanga was "seceding from chaos." Setting up a completely viable State with its capital in Elisabethville, and the most useful mineral reserves of the former colony--cobalt, copper, etc.--he offered the possibility for a future confederation with the rest of the former Colony. Yet he made it clear that his people had no moral duty to support those with whom their only real tie had been a former Colonial lumping. He showed no interest in helping build a Communist colony to succeed the Belgian.
Obviously, traditional American Foreign Policy would have welcomed the newly independent Katanga. America, involved in a desperate "Cold War" with an expanding Communist power, had a very real interest in retaining Katanga's resources for the West. America, as the leading Caucasian settler nation, should also have felt at least some sense of kindness towards those of another race, who showed only kindness to White settlers in Africa. But our State Department was deeply in the grips of that Fabian mindset identified in Chapter 16, and both under Eisenhower and Kennedy, that foreign service announced support for a UN effort to keep Katanga part of a nation perceived from a map, yet never actually such within human history.
There followed some of the most shameful incidents in American history. By September, 1961, under a policy directed by Kennedy's Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, the United States were actively engaged in flying UN mercenaries of death into Katanga. While the late UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold had claimed the action defensive, it was clearly shown to be nothing of the sort. Code named Operation Smash, they even bombed hospitals. [The staff of one such hospital wrote a book entitled, 46 Angry Men.]
While Conservatives in both parties assailed this policy in Congress, they might as well have banged their heads against a stone wall. One could easily write a piece longer than this whole handbook, detailing atrocities and implications in the suppression of Katanga. But we will let the lead article from America's most credible Business and Financial Weekly, Barron's, "Disgrace in the Congo," January 7, 1963, sum it all up:
By word and deed alike, the UN thus has flouted what the Founding Fathers called "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind." The same contempt for Western values has spawned the naked aggression against Katanga, a lawless act to which the Government of the United States, to its enduring shame, has become an accomplice. The aim of the unholy alliance, the American people have been told, is to unite the Congo under a central government which, possessed of the wealth of Katanga, will be viable and friendly. ... More to the point, the Congolese regime... happens to be not pro-Western but pro-Communist.
As a policy, then, the war on Katanga is ill-advised. It is also wholly immoral. For while the State Department has a conveniently short memory, ...UN troops were stationed in Katanga only upon the conditional consent of the local authorities. Each of the three UN military moves thus was launched in a clear-cut violation of a solemn pledge. Moreover, despite the best efforts of bland apologists to obscure the issue, nobody can seriously doubt that Katanga enjoys as great a right to independence and to the fruits of its labors as...Burundi or Upper Volta. On this score we have the testimony of "a resident of Africa for nearly fifty years," a man named Albert Schweitzer: ...
"It is inconceivable that we find in our day a foreign nation at war with Katanga in an effort to force it to pay revenues to the rest of the Congo... Reason and justice demand that this foreign state (i.e., the U.S.) and the United Nations withdraw their troops from Katanga's territory and recognize and respect in future the independence of this country."
For over two years...justice and reason have been in short supply in Leopoldville, Washington and New York. ...... The wisdom of U.S. policy...is obscure. Its total lack of principle is all too plain. On this score Barron's rests its case with Albert Schweitzer. "The colonial empire of the Congo no longer exists. There are left two distinct branches of this empire composed of peoples and tribes who, from the time of colonialism forward, have opposed each other. Neither of these two parts of the Congo has rights vis-a-vis the other part; neither has obligations towards the other. They are ... absolutely independent entities. It follows that no war waged by one of the above parties against the other for purposes of subjugation has the slightest justification in law. It also follows that no foreign state can pretend to have the right to subject one part of the Congo to the other part." By supporting the assault on Katanga, the Kennedy Administration has jeopardized U.S. security and compromised U.S. traditions. One day it will be called to strict account.
Amen! Nothing so well epitomizes the Fabian preference for contrived perception over reality, as later references to the Kennedy years as "Camelot." Never before did America stray so far from the Chivalric values of Arthur's legendary kingdom!
From a traditional perspective, America's involvement in Viet Nam may certainly be justified--but certainly not the methodology! The justification came from our being invited by an ally seeking assistance in a war which would control the very strategic "rice bowl" of Asia, at a time when America continued in a mortal battle with an expanding Communist empire seeking our own destruction. The both morally and tactically flawed methodology, however, continued the Fabian pursuit of contrived perception over reality. And neither honor nor the actual lives of Americans or Vietnamese were treated with much respect.
For openers, our Fabian "Arthur" pulled a "Lady MacBeth"; procuring the murders of the two principal leaders of the new ally; trashing the noble and absolutely practical ethic of Washington and Jefferson for the values of a despicable Asian cult. Then, after Kennedy's own assassination, his equally amoral successor adopted tactics calculated to prolong, not win, a war of growing, not shrinking, dimension. Instead of going for the enemy's jugular--his supply routes in the North--LBJ gave us several years of carefully preannounced buildups. The object, apparently, not to defeat Communism in Viet Nam, but to apply Keynesian fiscal stimuli to a faltering U.S. economy. [No, we were not at his war council; nor privy to the workings of the mind of Harvard's Robert Strange McNamara. Our only contact with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, was a demand that he be indicted for his actions in Katanga. But let he who would play devil's advocate suggest any other reason for waging a war in so quaint a manner!]
On November 11, 1965, following an example set by Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and their associates, 189+ years earlier, Rhodesia's leaders declared the independence of their landlocked State north of South Africa, in a formal document candidly setting forth the reasons that compelled their separation from Great Britain. While our Founding Fathers would doubtless have viewed the largely Anglo-Saxon, Celtic and Dutch, Rhodesian settlers as kindred spirits; those running American foreign policy in 1965, immediately responded to an appeal from the British Socialist Prime Minister Harold Wilson for world-wide Sanctions, intended to bring the Rhodesians to heel. With America taking a leading role, the UN was enlisted, and the greatest international lynch mob in history set in motion.
In Chapter Five, we touched upon the extraordinary quality of the Rhodesian Caucasian population. They represented a people to whom their British motherland owed an immense debt. While their Socialist adversary, Harold Wilson, had served as a clerk behind a desk in World War II, the Rhodesian leadership, virtually to a man, had participated in mortal combat on behalf of Britain. They were significant among those few, to whom the many "owed so much." This guide was there in 1966, and everywhere we went, we met honorable men who a generation earlier had risked everything to save a nation that at that moment was actively betraying its 43 year old promise of independence.
One of the many lies, spread around the world about Rhodesia, was that Whites were suppressing Bantu. That suppression must have been by magic potion, for during a week of wandering around Salisbury--the beautiful capital--we saw only two Policemen! Never in our lives, have we been in a more peaceful City!
Of course, Dean Rusk, still American Secretary of State, had already demonstrated his lack of concern for Negro rights in Africa, in managing the brutal UN suppression of Katanga. So it was clearly no concern for either the Matabele or the Mashona--the two great Bantu Tribes that shared what had been the self-Governing British Colony of Southern Rhodesia with the European settlers, which motivated the former Rhodes Scholar to seek the destruction of a settler society, in part inspired by the vision of the very benefactor who had helped finance Rusk's own education. The Fabian watchword was Majority Rule--and it was given the propagandist's interpretation that best suited each group being courted. In the centers of world power, no heed was paid to anyone who dared suggest that these were, in fact, three distinct peoples, with different genes, different cultures, different values and different aspirations.
For 11 years, most of the civilized world boycotted the 225,000 White settlers and their Bantu allies. In order to maintain high living standards, previously achieved, these had to devise local sources for all the parts and equipment, needed to keep both a modern economy and their armed forces functional. It took a while for the international Left to even get a semi-viable guerrilla movement operational in the Rhodesian bush. But then, although some of these so called "freedom fighters" had been trained in Communist countries, and had more modern equipment than the Rhodesians, the kill ratio of dead Communists to dead Rhodesians was probably never less than twenty-one to one, in any skirmish.
Yet in 1976, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith agreed that by 1980, he would surrender to the Fabian map cult; that Rhodesia would become a place called "Zimbabwe." The despicable dagger was thrust home by the United States of America--or better stated, those betraying the heritage of the United States. These brought enormous pressure on both the Republic of South Africa and the Shah of Iran, to cut off Rhodesia's flow of oil, if she did not come to terms; if she did not agree to die in an undifferentiated one-man, one-vote, election in a contrived (not even virtual) society, within those not so magic borders which the former Colonial power had constructed for ease of administration.
It was the same Fabian pursuit of perception rather than reality, as in Katanga. The only difference being that in Katanga, a Democratic Fabian crushed a pro-Western Negro tribe. In Rhodesia by 1976, a supposedly moderate Republican crushed the not so terribly distant cousins of the Founding Fathers of America! There is not the slightest doubt but that those Founding Fathers would have considered both acts absolutely indefensible!
The result is in the news these days. But that result was predicted long before UDI. It was to avoid that result, that the Rhodesians risked everything to challenge the dogma of a mad World, bent upon denying the realities of human life. Yet one thing which is not very well reported, is that most of the victims of the Mashona Marxist tyrant Mugabe are not White, but other Bantu. It is not Whites alone who are in permanent minority status. So too are the Matabele, whose tribal rights have also been trampled. Yet so also have been those of a Mashona minority, who preferred the freer society in the days of White control. When "virtue" is determined by counting noses--the Communist and Nazi method for Europe--the results can be very ugly indeed.
The issue in the Nigerian Civil War, in the struggle over an independent Biafra, was slightly different than that in the Congo. It was not so closely related to "Cold War" questions. But the dichotomy, between a traditional American foreign policy and the one of the day, was equally apparent. The Christian Ibo, a Negro tribe, whose ancestral Biafran homeland included substantial oil reserves, sought to opt out of a Federation forced upon them by a similar slavish devotion to the map of convenience adopted by their former British Colonial rulers. In the Federation, they were under perpetual domination by more numerous, racially mixed, Moslem tribes to the North, with whom they shared neither racial nor cultural identity, nor a common history beyond that chance previous mutual subjugation.
By July, 1969, the Combined News Services of the Rhodesian Broadcasting Company estimated that probably over a million had died in the Nigerian efforts to suppress Biafran independence. The President of the International Red Cross at the time, M. Marcel Naville, said in Geneva that The role of some non-African powers is incomprehensible ... Huge crowds--women and children--stand in mute lines before the closed feeding centres in Biafra, waiting for a miracle to open the doors. Some hundreds of thousands of children in Biafra are going to die in the next few days. It is necessary that the World realize that we are standing before a dreadful tragedy. Nigeria has treated the humanitarian organizations in an insolent manner.
On July 2nd of that year, Swedish Baron Carl von Rosen, who had been leading Biafran air relief operations, blamed Britain as the real power behind the war, and Britain and the Soviet Union for supplying Arms to the Nigerian central government. The British Labour Government justified their policy, at the time, on the basis that it was not in the interest of Africa that there should be any fragmentation of States. Yet to those who do not seek a Fabian or Communist World Order based upon an undifferentiated human ant hill, it would seem to be very much in the interest of each of us, that people live in Societies that reflect their own heritage, rather than the theories of other men.
The American role in Biafra was less direct. But we were the one major Western power that supported the British position. Continental Europe, as the Settler nations of Southern Africa, were horrified by its cruel application. We had, moreover, a major role in ending the Colonial era in Africa. If arbitrary and unreasoned decisions were made as to the timing, structure and formulation of independence, it was, more often than not, the result of importunations from our State Department; urgings based not upon compassion for Colonial peoples--compassion must be based on actual understanding, of which our State Department showed remarkably little--but on a pursuit of the same Fabian agenda, previously discussed. That slavish devotion to old maps was not an end in itself; only a contrived means to pursue the world view of the Montagus, Allports and Cousins, discussed in Chapter 16. Washington and Jefferson would have approached the issue very differently!
In the early 1970s, Chile elected a Marxist Government in a tight three way race; the victors obtaining just over one third of the vote. With America still deeply involved in a "Cold War" for survival against the forces of International Communism, this in any event should have been a cause for some concern. But the new Leftist Government moved almost immediately to seize the private property of American companies. It was an "on shore," if you will, reenactment of the contempt for our rights, which the Barbary Pirates had displayed towards our shipping 170 years earlier, and called for a traditional American response.
In this case, we were saved from having to make the tough decision, by the intervention of General Pinochet, a Conservative Chilean Military leader, who moved decisively to sustain his people's traditional values. The reason for mentioning the Chilean situation here, is because of the controversy that has swirled ever since, as to the extent of America's support for Pinochet; and because of recent attempts to virtually lynch the General for fighting Communism with the hard nosed--and sometimes hard fisted tactics--which the times required. It is instructive, considering the fact that the General voluntarily surrendered power to an elected Government over a decade ago, that the International Left would still target him, even in retirement, with their destructive venom.
Those who claim a bent for reforming the earth; for achieving a new enlightenment and a man made utopia, never forgive and never forget. Several years ago, when the aged General was in England recuperating from major surgery, the British Fabian Government seized him, and held him under an insulting house arrest, while Spanish Socialists tried to establish a basis to put him on trial in Spain for what he did in Chile! The pity is that those formulating American Foreign Policy did not speak out decisively--as did Lady Thatcher in Great Britain--on behalf of this true friend to American interests, when Great Britain and Spain were making a mockery of traditional law and protocol by threatening to punish a former head of State for how he saved his own country.
Pinochet was our friend, because traditional Chile and America had kindred interests in being done with secular humanist thugs--whether elected or not--who did not respect private property. We do not, of course, suggest that he would have put America's interests first; he was a loyal Chilean. But a friend he was, and the silence of the Clinton Administration, when he was being held by British Socialists, at the behest of Spanish Socialists, is surely another example of how dishonorable our foreign policy has become.
In 1979, the friendly Monarchy in Iran fell to what appeared to be little better than a mob manipulated by a religious fanatic, pursuing an old blood feud with the Royal House. This presented a somewhat different set of issues to the United States. There was no General Pinochet on the scene, ready to move against the Revolutionaries to protect both his people's heritage and the legitimate interests of their American friends. Worse, a group of anti-American enthusiasts had seized our embassy and were holding almost four dozen of our personnel hostage! The new Government, coming into being, would scarcely even talk to us; while we were being demonized across that land.
The question was not so much what needed to be done. Most Americans of any stripe--either in Washington and Jefferson's day or now--would have supported a rescue operation. The problem was in the mechanics for implementation. And the difference in what happened and what should have happened came down perhaps to a state of mind. [For our purpose, we will not get into the question of whether or not a macro strike should have been considered. We have no problem with the decision, eventually made, for a surgical rescue. But that decision should have been almost instantaneous!] The point is that America, in 1979, had a far less ready state of mind than America at her inception or shortly thereafter. It is essential for an effective foreign policy, that it be backed by both military capability and the will to use it--the capacity, as Jefferson put it, to punish the first insult.
While President Carter had a naval background, his Administration was not distinguished by an effort to improve the level of confidence, competence or initiative in the American Armed Forces. But this was precisely what had been called for in the aftermath of the Viet Nam War. So when a crack unit with eight high tech helicopters set off, in the single most significant American military mission from the end of the Viet Nam War in 1973 until the Gulf War over 17 years later, one would have hoped that the mission would have gone off as smoothly as Jefferson's War against the Barbary Pirates in 1801. But it was not just America's foreign policy that had changed!
That smooth rescue operations were possible, even by Americans in 1979 & 1980, was clearly demonstrated when Ross Perot hired private mercenaries to rescue some of his employees in a similar Iranian hostage situation. Yet the premier official rescue mission of the era had to be aborted, when three of the eight helicopters, needed for the rescue, were abandoned on the ground in Iran as dysfunctional. America was humiliated, and the hostages had to wait until the eve of a tougher, more traditional American Administration; when our foes finally blinked and released them--lest they finally have to face a strong America.
The state of mind to which we refer, was not just Jefferson's idea that we should punish the first insult. It was inherent in the philosophy reflected in the writing of the Founding Fathers on military preparedness--strength not from a great standing army, but from an able bodied manhood (a militia) well trained and well armed, each with a sense of personal responsibility for their own defense. The Second Amendment--the right to keep and bear arms (Chapter Two)--reflected more than mere permission. Duty and responsibility went with liberty. George Washington specifically advocated the Swiss system: America's youth, armed with military grade weapons in the home, ready to respond to any threat at a moment's notice.
The aborted rescue was not a militia operation. It was a Governmental mission. But irresponsibility begets irresponsibility, and an America that had ceased to expect responsibility from each of us, became far less capable of obtaining the higher level of responsibility when it was truly needed. If there were ever eight machines of war, which should have been ready to perform flawlessly as conditions required, it were those eight helicopters that landed in the Iranian desert. To be sure, no machinery is perfect. All such equipment requires human maintenance. Somehow, we cannot but believe that those helicopters would have performed better had they been sent out by men steeped in Washingtonian and Jeffersonian values, including the moral concepts and individual mettle on which those values were premised.
Of all the peoples of the earth, those who had the most in common with America and the Americans, were the Settler nations of South Africa. As to America, South Africa's European settlers came in the Seventeenth Century from a country on the North Sea. Like Americans, the early South Africans were rugged and individualistic. They faced challenge with their rifles and their Bibles. In each land, there were great treks (a South African word) of settlers early in the Nineteenth Century, crossing coastal mountain ranges to spread into a vast interior; where such pioneers, in very small groups, would face not only hardship from the elements, but often vicious attacks from other races.
America's wars with England came earlier, but the Afrikaner Nations fought two wars with Great Britain in the later years of the Nineteenth Century, trying to preserve the independence of the Transvaal and Orange Free State--later parts of the Republic of South Africa. A people who honor their forebears--a Nation to which the Fifth Commandment has real meaning--virtually every city, or small dorp in rural South Africa, has its own monument to honor the Voortrekkers--pioneer ancestors of the modern Afrikaner--or the British settlers of the Nineteenth Century. An American, staring at the images, feels an eerie sense that, even nine thousand miles away, he is really still at home.
South Africa was vilified by Leftist demagogues in the Third World, in the centers of Leftwing thought in America and Europe, as well as in the Communist countries, because in gaining independence from Great Britain in 1911, she elected not to be defined as a nation by the colonial map. By 1950, this reluctance to embrace the folly, later forced upon the people in Katanga by Fabian Socialists at the UN and in Washington, and on the people of Biafra and Rhodesia by other manifestations of the same intrigue and brutality, had been fomulated into a specific goal, called "Apartheid." We make the point that this was only a goal, because the propagandist onslaught with which the South Africans were bombarded by the international Left, completely ignored that fact.
There may have been injustices during the colonial era; "Apartheid" was no continuation of any one of them. It was a specific plan to end what was considered an unfair legacy, by restoring the unique heritage of each of the very distinct and quite different peoples within the geographic domain covered by the old map. "Apartheid" simply means apartness, and the principal domestic opposition to its implementation in South Africa came from business interests which wanted to keep the non-white peoples of the old domain within the newer State, as a source of cheap labor. There was also some hesitation, even among nominal supporters of the proposed restoration, because of the considerable expense that would be involved, and because even many of the conservative adherents to the Nationalist Government did not want to risk giving up their inexpensive household help or farm labor.
The highly emotional rant on American College campuses against "Apartheid," actually blamed South Africans for old wrongs that Apartheid was intended to cure! But it was not in the protests of ignorant students, or among the intimidated trustees of College endowments, mindlessly selling off shares of stock in companies that did business with a people who had fought valiantly beside Americans in two World Wars and in Korea, that the real motive for the international crusade against South Africa will be found. It was precisely as with Katanga, Biafra and Rhodesia. South Africa challenged the movement for an undifferentiated humanity; and those embracing the same dogma as the Montagus, Allports and Cousins of the world, dared not let South Africa survive with her principles in tact--a rallying point for all true nations of the earth.
Read again Vattel's definition of a nation in Chapter 15 and compare it with the sophistry of Gordon Allport in Chapter 16, and you will see what the war for Africa was all about. Everything else was simply the Fabian pursuit of perception over reality. South Africa was actually the best country in all of Africa for a non-White to live. And the borders of South Africa, much like our own underprotected Southwest, were inundated by those seeking what Europe and the Americas were being told was "oppression."
In giving support to the Leftist "hue and cry," the American Government was on the wrong side, at the wrong time.
The Gulf War was a just war; America's legitimate interest reflected both in our need to import oil from the region and a previously very friendly and mutually beneficial business relationship with the Kuwaiti people. (At a time when we were still spending enormous funds to buy friends overseas, the Kuwaitis were reinvesting huge sums from their oil profits in the United States! They were probably a significant factor in the dramatic rebound of the United States stock markets after the 1987 crash.)
Kuwait was also strategically located in relation to the rest of the richest oil reserves on earth. Lying between Iraq on the North, and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates on the South and East, it was an obvious stepping stone for a much broader seizure of land and oil by an ambitious Iraqi Socialist dictator. Kuwait asked our help, and we wisely responded.
The Gulf War served as a showcase for an American Military, its morale and confidence restored by a patriotic renaissance under Ronald Reagan. The difference in performance between the effort directed by the 1st Bush Administration, and that directed a quarter century earlier in Southeast Asia by Fabian illusionists Rusk and McNamara, could not have been more dramatic. The reason is not obscure.
Kennedy & Johnson sought a perpetual stalemate in the "Cold War," adopting the bizarre rationalizations of Rusk and McNamara for preserving peace through a policy of "mutually assured destruction." This stalemate worked well for the Fabians, of course, as it provided an excuse to have the American taxpayers pay for their egalitarian projects, such as those directed against Katanga, Rhodesia, Biafra and South Africa. Between the Western Left and the Communists, traditional societies all over the world were undermined. For various reasons, the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations, basically drifted along under the same concept; the dilemma seemingly insoluble.
Because Reagan was something of a political outsider, he did not sense the same conformist pressures in which the sophisticates were foundering. Giving more credence to common sense and traditional patriotism, he saw Communism as an evil to be defeated--not a rival in a race to a new world order. And he set out to restore American military capability and credibility. Within eight years, the Communism that had been used to terrorize American moderates, had collapsed in Europe, and the Cold War was over. Washington and Jefferson would have understood! The combination of strength with honor remained as powerful as ever. It was this force that President Bush deployed in the Gulf.
While we will not pretend to know what he intended by references to a "new world order," the combination of a well executed military operation with a precise sense of when to call a halt, deserved high praise. In reviewing our list of decision demanding confrontations, Bush I comes away looking immeasurably better than Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford or Carter. If the rest of his foreign policy was less incisive; in Kuwait, at least, he performed admirably.
In Somalia, as in the Congo, Rhodesia, Nigeria and South Africa, a Fabian mindset in the United States foreign service stuck a nose into a situation where no reasonable American policy had any role at all. That country--a consolidation of a former Italian with a former British Colony on the farthest side of Africa--might well have been disintegrating into chaos. We had no conceivable interest or Constitutional purpose there. A yet more serious departure from the wisdom of our own tradition came in the suggestion that we should engage in a form of "Nation Building."
We have discussed the concept of Nation in Chapter 15, on Immigration. It is clear from official policy on the Congo, Rhodesia, Nigeria and South Africa, that the American State Department at the time either had no clue as to of what a Nation consists, or were deliberately obfuscating the concept in order to undermine it. It is not and never has been simply a matter of all people living within certain lines on an old map.
As urged in Chapter 15, a sense of nationality is something that arises through shared values and common experience. It of course involves blood lines--genes and consanguinity, kith and kin. Above all, it must come from within. It negates the very concept to suggest that it may be imposed--or if one prefer a ridiculous euphemism, "taught"--from without. If the many tribes in Somalia--many anthropologically similar--do not feel a sufficient sense of kinship to think as one people, it is the grossest form of tyranny to try to impose that sense upon them by armed intervention. While some might consider such course expedient, only American "Liberals"--i.e. in the modern, Fabian sense--would consider it idealistic or altruistic.
This does not mean that a political region in chaos may not be dealt with. Certainly, when a country in the process of disintegration becomes a threat to its neighbors, they may react in self-protection. America was not set up to be either Policeman or Fireman for the world. Our Constitution creates a vehicle for dealing with the world, but it does not entrust to that vehicle--i.e. the U.S. Armed Forces, Foreign Service, etc.--any duty or role but that of service to American interests. This does not mean that American missionaries, visionaries, altruists, socio-paths or whatever, may not try to help, advise or proselytize the earth. But in those pursuits, our Federal Government has no role.
Notwithstanding that point, the fact that our Government sent U.S. Rangers to Somalia--"in harms way"--but did not give them proper logistical support and equipment, illustrates another problem--the Viet Nam syndrome in another form. It is fundamental in a Republic such as ours, that no soldier is expendable to further the questionable intrigues of politicians or theorists. To die for one's country is one thing. To die to further a Fabian pursuit of World Government or an egalitarian delusion is quite another.
Haiti is one of the poorest countries on earth, probably the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. It has no history of knowledgeable public participation in free elections. There is no tradition remotely analogous to the sort of vital and vigorous political discussion that marked much of the early history of America's settlers. Yet even with vigorous public debate, there was nothing remotely approaching universal white male suffrage during the first 36 years of Constitutional Government in America.
It is absurd, rather than hypocritical, for America to seek to impose one man/one vote political procedures on any other people. In those societies, such as Switzerland, where there are traditions that support it; universal suffrage works because of those traditions. In those countries, which have no such tradition, it is a varied story--nowhere entirely satisfactory.
In Chapter 10, we discussed the dangers of unchecked universal suffrage, and quoted James Madison, Father Of The Constitution, on the historic disaster that has followed the implementation of pure Democracy. The concept of popular Government in America was always linked to the concept of a knowledgeable, responsibly involved electorate. It is inconceivable that any of the brave men who launched an independent America would ever have voluntarily agreed to be governed by the majority vote of an electorate without respect for private property, private morals or individual responsibility, without a clue as to the complex functions of Government.
Those who signed the Declaration of Independence, as those who gave us our written Constitution, would have reacted exactly as did General Cedras, an intelligent and patriotic Haitian, when a Marxist movement, headed by a defrocked Priest who knew how to stir an illiterate mob with the slogans of envy, took over Haiti in a "free" election. Cedras, a graduate of West Point and member of Haiti's small, but cultured and educated upper class, acted to preserve civilization and the right to private property. Taking over the Government, he restored order, decency and economic policies consistent with traditional American values. Any traditional American Government would have applauded his intervention.
Unfortunately for the people of Haiti, America had also fallen under the influence of a shameless demagogue. President Clinton was the same type of Rhodes Scholar as Dean Rusk--Butcher of Elisabethville and mortal enemy of the Rhodesians. But Clinton was even more ambitious in pursuit of Fabian illusion. And the unelected Government in Haiti provided him with the chance to make a statement--to create a perception, irrespective of any reality, with which to impress the Third World.
No one, who has observed the self-indulgent habits of the Clinton household, can possibly imagine either "Bill" or Hillary enduring the life in a mob run Haiti for even a weekend. But as Commander-In-Chief of Armed Forces entrusted to him to protect American interests, Clinton set out to demonstrate his commitment to "one-person/one-vote" Democracy everywhere in the world. He could certainly not permit any deviation in the Caribbean! So the mightiest military power on earth, threatened a war of conquest against its poorest and perhaps weakest neighbor. If the civilized, American educated, leader did not surrender to our new President's demand that the mob be returned to power, and that the Haitian patriot leave his native land, to go into a shamed exile, Clinton would invade!
Can anyone even begin to imagine the absolute horror that would be human history, had man been subject to such cynical and malevolent interventions throughout his quest for a better tomorrow? Can anyone explain just what benefit there was to America, to turn the poor illiterates of Haiti over to an anti-American Marxist demagogue? Or the virtue in counting the noses of those who fail, in order to claim power to destroy the achievements of those who succeed?
In order to keep this Chapter within bounds, we link to our May 1, 1999 article: American Foreign Policy At The Crossroads (Clinton's War On Serbia), for a detailed discussion from a traditional standpoint.
The bin Laden related terrorist attacks on American embassies in Africa, and the attack on our ship off the coast of Yemen, during the last years of the Clinton Administration, clearly called for an effective response. That Clinton provided only a vainglorious show--basically the destruction of an aspirin factory in the Sudan and a very expensive fireworks display in the mountains of Afghanistan, attests his Fabian focus for what others may perceive, rather than what is real.
The younger President Bush's initially more disciplined, step by step response to the destruction of major buildings in New York City, was far more in accordance with traditional American Foreign Policy. Sadly, he soon began listening to very badly flawed advice.
Here, as with the Barbary Pirates, we are dealing with a form of banditry--although these bandits seek to seize our confidence and peace of mind, rather than our goods on the High Seas. But there are clear parallels to the challenge which Jefferson met so successfully in 1801. We can only hope that the present crisis--spread out over a far greater geographic theatre of operations--is eventually as well resolved. For a more detailed development of the approach which we feel best serves American interests and traditional values, see The War On Terror.
There is not only no situation, in which the traditional American Foreign Policy is unable to protect our interests. There is no situation where it is not also both more easily explained in terms of all past human experience, and more efficient to administer. We have been duped by theorists with agendas into abandoning that which was an essential element of the America won for us on the battlefield of our birth; sustained for us by wise brave men, who took up the valiant sword of Washington and the wise pen of Jefferson.
It is a policy that works because there is at least a small thread of decency in most people, however debauched, and at least a thread of reality in most leaders. And even the most selfish scoundrel, however indifferent to the suffering of his own people, will think twice before he invites the terrible retribution that may be expected from a people who never threaten others--never attempt to impose an alien system on anyone;--who encourage productivity and innovation among their own--while sharing knowledge with mankind:--but focus their entire Governmental energies in foreign dealings on protecting--fairly but effectively--what is theirs. The risk/loss versus gain ratio is too completely against those who would conspire against such a people.
The alternative has been a policy of unctuous Fabian promotion. It may have been welcomed by those of a Socialist bent in other lands. It has been bitterly resented--and correctly resented--by the achievers in those same lands; particularly those who actually shared some of the values that made America, and who wanted the same freedom from outside interference that was so important to the Founding Fathers. It is way past time that we were done with it.